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Abstract
This paper shows that money can play an important role as an information variable when
initial output data are measured with error and subject to revision. Using an estimated
model ofthe euro area we ﬁnd that current output estimates may be substantially improved
by including money growth in the information set. The gain in precision, however, depends
on the magnitude ofthe output measurement error relative to the money demand shock.
We ﬁnd noticable but small improvements in output estimates, ifthe uncertainty due to
money demand shocks corresponds to the estimated variance obtained from the money
demand equation. Money plays a quantitatively more important role with regard to output
estimation ifwe allow f or a contribution ofmonetary analysis in reducing uncertainty due to
money demand shocks. In this case, money also helps to reduce uncertainty about output
forecasts.
Keywords: euro area, Kalman ﬁlter, macroeconomic modelling, measurement error,
monetary policy rules, rational expectations
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Non-technical summary
In this study, we perform a quantitative assessment of the role of money as an indicator
variable for monetary policy when aggregate data are initially measured with error and
subject to revision. We start by analyzing the sequence of revisions to euro area-wide data
and ﬁnd that measures of real output have been subject to substantial revisions over a period
of up to nine months, whereas measures of prices and money have generally been subject to
relatively minor revisions that occur within a short period of the initial data release. Given
this pattern of euro area data revisions, monetary aggregates have a potentially signiﬁcant
role in providing information about the current level of output.
To analyze the macroeconomic implications of uncertainty with regard to current output,
we then utilize the euro area model developed by Coenen and Wieland (2000), augmented
by the estimated money demand equation of Coenen and Vega (1999), together with a cal-
ibrated speciﬁcation for the output revision process. In particular, the model incorporates
rational expectations and exhibits nominal inertia due to overlapping wage contracts. Fur-
thermore, the short-term nominal interest rate is assumed to be the instrument of monetary
policy. The quantity of money is determined recursively by money demand, as a function of
the chosen nominal interest rate and the output and price level consistent with this interest
rate. Since the model does not assign a causal role to the money stock in inﬂuencing output
or inﬂation (other than through nominal interest rates), this approach may be viewed as a
means of providing a reasonable lower bound on the information content of money.
Money has a potentially useful role as an indicator variable in our model, because money
demand depends on the true level of output whereas the monetary policymaker and private
agents only receive a noisy measure of output. We use the Kalman ﬁlter to determine the
optimal weight on money (as well as the other relevant information variables in the model)
in estimating the true level of output. We then proceed to compute the reduction in output
uncertainty that is achieved by including money in the information set.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 6
We ﬁnd that money may play an important role as an information variable and may
result in major improvements in current output estimates. However, this depends on the
magnitude of the output measurement errors relative to the unobserved component of the
money demand shocks. If the policymaker observes the money stock but has no contem-
poraneous information about money demand shocks, then monetary aggregates provide
relatively little information about aggregate demand. In contrast, if the policymaker con-
ducts monetary analysis that provides contemporaneous information about money demand
shocks, then the money stock provides substantial information about current output and
also improves the accuracy of short-term output forecasts.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 7
1 Introduction
Many macroeconomic time series are subject to substantial revisions, and hence such data
only provide imperfect information about the true state of the economy at a given point
in time. In light ofthese data limitations monetary policymakers and researchers alike
have long been interested in identifying indicator variables that provide precise and timely
information. At least since the early 1970s research on the information content of alternative
indicators has highlighted the potential usefulness of monetary aggregates. Some examples
ofthis line ofresearch are Kareken et al. (1973), Friedman (1975, 1990), Tinsley et al.
(1980) and Angeloni et al. (1994). These evaluations have typically been conducted in
reduced-form models and models with adaptive expectations.
More recently, research on Taylor-style interest rate rules has re-emphasized the im-
portance of“real-time” data uncertainty f or the design ofmonetary policy albeit without
considering money’s potential role as an information variable. In particular, a number of
studies with U.S. data have found that uncertainty arising from revisions of output gap
and inﬂation measurements may lead to a signiﬁcant deterioration in the performance of
such interest rate rules.1 This problem may be even more important in the euro area, for
which aggregate time series have only been developed fairly recently and have been subject
to ongoing reﬁnement.
In this study, we perf orm a quantitative assessment ofthe role ofmoney as an indicator
variable for monetary policy in the euro area. Thus, we investigate the same idea as the
earlier literature on the information content of money in a forward-looking model of the
economy. However, as the more recent literature on interest rate rules and real-time data
uncertainty we aim to obtain the best possible estimates ofthose variables entering the
policy rule and we model the process ofreal-time measurements empirically to match data
revisions. In analyzing the sequence ofrevisions to euro area-wide data, we ﬁnd that
1See for example the evaluations of interest rate rules under data uncertainty by Orphanides (1998), Or-
phanides et al. (2000) and Rudebusch (2000). For a large-scale analysis of the diﬀerences between alternative
vintages of U.S. macroeconomic data the reader is referred to Croushore and Stark (1999).ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 8
measures ofreal output have been subject to substantial revisions over a period ofup
to nine months, whereas measures ofprices and money have generally been subject to
relatively minor revisions that occur within a short period ofthe initial data release. Given
this pattern ofeuro area data revisions, monetary aggregates have a potentially signiﬁcant
role in providing information about the current level of aggregate demand.
To analyze the macroeconomic implications ofdata uncertainty, we utilize the euro area
model developed by Coenen and Wieland (2000), augmented by the estimated money de-
mand equation ofCoenen and Vega (1999), together with a calibrated speciﬁcation f or the
output revision process. In particular, the model incorporates rational expectations and
exhibits nominal inertia due to overlapping wage contracts. Furthermore, the short-term
nominal interest rate is assumed to be the instrument ofmonetary policy. The quantity
ofmoney is determined recursively by money demand, as a f unction ofthe chosen nominal
interest rate and the output and price level consistent with this interest rate. Thus, im-
plicitly we assume that any eﬀect ofa change in the nominal money stock on real output
and inﬂation comes through the associated change in the nominal interest rate. In other
words, direct eﬀects ofmoney on output and inﬂation are absent f rom the model. This
assumption is typical ofthe current generation ofmacroeconomic models 2 and is consistent
with optimizing behavior ifcertain restrictions 3 are satisﬁed. Since the model does not as-
sign a causal role to the money stock in inﬂuencing output or inﬂation (other than through
nominal interest rates), this approach may be viewed as a means ofproviding a reasonable
lower bound on the information content of money.
Money has a potentially useful role as an indicator variable in our model, because
2This includes most of the smaller-scale models currently used for research on monetary policy (see for
example Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Fuhrer (1997) or Orphanides and Wieland (1998)) as well as
large-scale policy models such as the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US model (see Brayton and Tinsley
(1996)), the ECB’s Area-Wide Model (see Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001)), or the multi-country model of
Taylor (1993a). An alternative approach, which allows for direct eﬀects of money on inﬂation, would be the
P
∗ model of Hallman et al. (1991) estimated more recently for Germany by T¨ odter and Reimers (1994) and
for the euro area by Gerlach and Svensson (2000).
3These restrictions are discussed in more detail in Ireland (2001), McCallum (2000) and Leahy (2000).
They include, for example, the separability of the utility function in consumption, money and leisure or the
absence of transaction costs of purchases.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 9
money demand depends on the true level ofoutput whereas the central bank and private
agents only receive a noisy measure ofoutput. We use the Kalman ﬁlter to determine
the optimal weight on money (as well as the other relevant information variables in the
model) in estimating the true state ofthe economy (cf . Pearlman et al. (1986), Svensson
and Woodford (2000)).4 We then proceed to compute the reduction in output uncertainty
that is achieved by including money in the information set.
We ﬁnd that money may play an important role as an information variable and may
result in major improvements in current output estimates. However, this depends on the
magnitude ofthe output measurement errors relative to the unobserved component ofthe
money demand shocks. Ifthe policymaker observes the money stock but has no contem-
poraneous information about money demand shocks, then monetary aggregates provide
relatively little information about aggregate demand. In contrast, if the central bank con-
ducts monetary analysis that provides contemporaneous information about money demand
shocks, then the money stock provides substantial information about current output and
also improves the accuracy ofshort-term output f orecasts. 5
Finally, it should be emphasized that our analysis focuses solely on uncertainty regarding
actual output, and does not address the problem ofestimating potential output. While
uncertainty about potential output has important consequences for the determination of
monetary policy, we neglect this issue here because the money stock is related to actual
output and thus cannot serve as a direct source ofinf ormation regarding potential output. 6
The remainder ofthis paper is organized as f ollows. Section 2 characterizes the tim-
ing and magnitude ofrevisions to euro area data on aggregate output, prices, and money.
4Our paper is related to recent work by Dotsey and Hornstein (2000) on the usefuleness of money for
discretionary policy. However, they focus on impulse responses in a calibrated model of the U.S. economy
with simple measurement error, while we derive measures of the information content of money in an empir-
ically estimated model of the euro area with a more general empirical speciﬁcation of measurement error.
Further, there are important diﬀerences in the information structure, which we discuss later on.
5Details about the ECB’s approach to monetary analysis may be found in the May 2001 issue of the
ECB Monthly Bulletin, and in Masuch et al. (2001). For further discussion related to the United States,
see Orphanides and Porter (2001).
6For the implications of uncertainty about output gaps and potential output (or unemployment gaps and
the NAIRU) for monetary policy we refer the reader to Ehrmann and Smets (2000), Orphanides (2000) and
Wieland (1998) among others.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 10
Section 3 outlines the behavioral equations ofthe model, and indicates alternative represen-
tations ofthe output revision process. Section 4 describes our methodology f or determining
the optimal ﬁltering weights and for evaluating the information content of indicator vari-
ables. Section 5 illustrates the information role of money for the case of a highly stylized
money demand equation, while Section 6 uses the complete model described above to eval-
uate the quantitative signiﬁcance ofmoney as an indicator variable. Section 7 summarizes
our conclusions and suggests several directions for future research. Finally, the Appendix
reports further details of our methodology as well as additional sensitivity analysis regarding
our results.
2 Data Uncertainty in the Euro Area
Some macroeconomic data series, such as nominal interest rates, exchange rates, and raw
materials prices, are readily available and not subject to revision. In contrast, indicators
ofaggregate quantities and prices are more diﬃcult to construct, and are f requently sub-
ject to substantial revisions as additional information becomes available to the statistical
agency.7 For the euro area, aggregate data has only become available fairly recently (with
the harmonization ofstatistical procedures across the individual member countries), and
hence the record ofinitial releases and revisions is necessarily limited. Nevertheless, it is
useful to characterize the properties of these revisions in order to shed some light on the
degree ofdata uncertainty in the euro area.
Thus, we proceed to analyze the timing and magnitude ofrevisions to euro area output,
price, and money data, beginning with the advent ofEuropean Monetary Union in 1999.
As measures ofreal output, we consider monthly data on industrial production (excluding
construction) as well as quarterly data on real GDP. To measure aggregate prices, we
consider monthly data on the Harmonized Index ofConsumer Prices (HICP) and quarterly
data on the GDP price deﬂator. Finally, we consider monthly data for M3; we focus on this
7Further revisions occur on a less frequent basis as the result of deﬁnitional changes, such as switching
to a diﬀerent benchmark year for the national income accounts. Such revisions often shift the entire level of
a data series, but may have relatively minor implications for the determination of monetary policy.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 11
Figure 1: Revisions to Industrial Production









Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin.
measure of money because Coenen and Vega (1999) found that the demand function for M3
has been remarkably stable. In each case, we utilize real-time data series over the period
October 1998 through December 2000, as published in consecutive issues ofthe European
Central Bank’s Monthly Bulletin over the period January 1999 through February 2001.8
The nature ofthe revision process is best understood with an example. Figure 1 shows
monthly revisions ofindustrial production at the start ofmonetary union. Estimates ofeuro
area industrial production in January and February 1999, for instance, were ﬁrst published
in the May 1999 issue ofthe ECB Monthly Bulletin. The estimates ofthe index reported in
May were 108.6 and 108.2 for January and February industrial output, respectively. Over
the following months the statistical authorities revised these estimates upwards. Revisions
only ceased by the end ofthe year. The magnitude ofthe revisions over this period was
0.7 in both cases. Clearly, these revisions suggest a signiﬁcant degree ofdata uncertainty,
which persisted for some time.
8The ECB’s monthly bulletin is a convenient source for obtaining consistent real-time data. Furthermore,
each bulletin represents a reasonably accurate summary of the data available to the ECB Governing Council
at its ﬁrst meeting each month: the cut-oﬀ date for inclusion in the bulletin predates each meeting, and
the bulletin itself is published a week later. However, in future work it would be interesting to analyze the
timing of revisions as published by the statistical agency that actually compiles each data series.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 12





largest upward revision 0.93 0.81 0.54 0.54 0.46 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.18
largest downward revision -0.60 -0.46 -0.55 -0.27 -0.26 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.36
mean absolute revision 0.34 0.28 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13
Consumer Prices(b)
l a r g e s t u p w a r d r e v i s i o n 00 0000000
largest downward revision -0.10 -0.10 0000000
mean absolute revision 0.03 0.02 0000000
M3(c)
largest upward revision 0.37 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.03
largest downward revision -0.18 -0.13 -0.12 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 -0.02
mean absolute revision 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 1999 to February 2001.
Note:
(a) Index of Industrial Production (excluding construction), seasonally adjusted.
(b) Harmonized
Index of Consumer Prices, Dec. 1998 = 100, not seasonally adjusted.
(c) M3 Index, Dec. 1998 = 100,
seasonally adjusted; calculated from monthly diﬀerences in levels adjusted for reclassiﬁcations, other reval-
uations, exchange rate variations etc.
Table 1 provides summary statistics regarding the revision process for monthly euro
area data. The ﬁrst column is associated with the ﬁrst revision (one month after the initial
publication), the next column reﬂects the second revision (i.e., the diﬀerence between the
values published one month and two months following the ﬁrst publication), and so on until
the revision in the tenth month following initial publication. For each series, the ﬁrst row
indicates the largest upward revision at each interval (as a percent ofthe value published
in the previous month), while the second row indicates the largest downward revision, and
the third row indicates the mean absolute revision.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 13
sions over the ﬁrst year after the initial publication. For example, the ﬁrst monthly revision
ofthis series has a mean absolute value of0.34 percent, with a maximum upward revision
of0.93 percent and a maximum downward revision of0.6 percent. While the magnitude of
revisions gradually declines as time passes, revisions exceeding 0.1 percent are not unusual
during each of the next few months after the initial publication.
In contrast, the consumer price data are typically not revised at all; the only exceptions
are apparently due to corrections ofreporting errors. Clearly, the lack ofrevisions does
not imply that these data provide an exact measure ofaggregate inﬂation. However, mea-
surement biases in the consumer price index have mainly been identiﬁed with longer-term
factors (such as improving product quality, introduction of new goods and services, and
changes in expenditure shares), and hence these biases may not be crucial in evaluating
higher-frequency ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation rate. In any case, as we will see below, the
GDP price deﬂator (which is less susceptible to measurement bias than the HICP) also
exhibits relatively small revisions.
Finally, the magnitude of initial data revisions is substantially smaller for M3 than for
industrial output: the maximum upward and downward revisions in the ﬁrst month are
less than halfas large (in percentage terms). Furthermore, subsequent revisions in M3 are
relatively small and infrequent, so that the mean absolute revision never exceeds 0.1 percent
from the second month onwards.
Table 2 reports summary statistics regarding the revision process for real GDP and the
GDP price deﬂator, which are available on a quarterly basis. These statistics indicate that
real GDP is subject to fairly large revisions.9 For example, in the ﬁrst revision (one quarter
after the initial publication), the maximum upward revision exceeds a full percentage point,
and the mean absolute revision is about 0.8 percent ofthe previously published value.
Even three quarters after the initial publication, the mean absolute revision of real GDP is
about 0.5 percent. In contrast, revisions ofthe GDP deﬂator are much smaller: the mean
9Some of these revisions have occurred as individual member countries have moved to the ESA95 har-
monization of national income accounts and are likely to become smaller as the implementation process is
completed in most countries.
Evidently, the industrial production data are subject to substantial and frequent revi-ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 14





largest upward revision 1.49 1.21 1.14 0.20 0.19
largest downward revision -0.91 -0.95 0 -0.02 -0.08
mean absolute revision 0.80 0.69 0.47 0.11 0.14
GDP Price Deﬂator(b)
largest upward revision 0.28 0.38 0.09 0.09 0.09
largest downward revision -0.10 -0.09 0 -0.09 0
mean absolute revision 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.05
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 1999 to February 2001.
Note: (a) Seasonally adjusted.(b) Seasonally adjusted.
absolute revision is only about 0.1 percent in each ofthe ﬁrst two quarters af ter the initial
publication, and subsequent revisions are negligible in magnitude. Evidently, revisions to
nominal GDP for the euro area are primarily due to revisions regarding real output rather
than prices.
Thus, the monthly and quarterly data yield remarkably similar conclusions regarding
real-time data uncertainty in the euro area. Industrial production and real GDP are each
subject to relatively large revisions during the ﬁrst several quarters after the initial pub-
lication, indicating that data uncertainty regarding the current level ofreal output is a
non-trivial issue for the euro area.10 By comparison, both measures ofaggregate prices (the
HICP and the GDP price deﬂator) and the broad money stock (M3) are subject to rela-
10Revisions of the growth rate of real output tend to be smaller. As discussed in the ECB’s monthly
bulletin of August 2001 (see pages 26-28) the average size of revisions of quarter-on-quarter growth since the
ﬁrst quarter of 1999 was 0.2 percentage points. Throughout this paper, however, we continue to focus on the
level rather than the growth rate, because in our view, the level of output relative to the economy’s potential
is more relevant for determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy and its eﬀect on inﬂation than
the diﬀerence between actual and potential growth rates.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 15
tively small revisions during the ﬁrst quarter after the initial publication, and to negligible
revisions in subsequent quarters.
These results raise the possibility that money can serve as a useful indicator in providing
real-time information about ﬂuctuations in real output. An additional advantage of money
as an indicator variable is that money data typically becomes available earlier than output
data.11 In the following analysis we will primarily focus on the information gain from money
in the presence ofmeasurement error, but we will return to the gains arising f rom the earlier
availability ofmoney in the sensitivity analysis at the end ofthe paper.
3 A Rational-Expectations Model with Data Uncertainty
To quantify the information content of money, we utilize the euro area macroeconomic model
ofCoenen and Wieland (2000), augmented by the money demand equation estimated by
Coenen and Vega (1999). Since these equations are speciﬁed at a quarterly frequency, it
seems reasonable to assume (in light ofthe results ofthe previous section) that observations
on aggregate output are subject to measurement error, while aggregate prices, money, and
nominal interest rates are observed without measurement error.12 It also seems reasonable
to assume that the money demand ofeach individual household or ﬁrm depends on its
own income and expenditures (which are known to that household or ﬁrm), while neither
private agents nor the central bank observe the true level ofaggregate output. 13 Under
these assumptions, aggregate money demand will be related to the true level ofaggregate
income, and hence observations on the money stock can provide useful information about
movements in aggregate output.
11This holds even for monthly data. For example, in June one learns about money growth and inﬂation
in May but about industrial production in April.
12In the model considered here, measurement errors of the money stock would have the same eﬀect as
money demand shocks in reducing the information content of money as an indicator of aggregate output.
Thus, one could always capture the eﬀect of money measurement error by considering a slightly higher
variance of the money demand shocks.
13Thus, the information structure diﬀers from Dotsey and Hornstein (2000) who assume instead that
private agents know the true level of aggregate output. To us it seems more reasonable to assume that
private agents face similar uncertainty regarding aggregate data as the central bank.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 16
3.1 The Behavioral Equations
The behavioral equations ofthe model are indicated in Table 3.14 As shown in equation
(1), the aggregate price level pt is determined as a weighted average ofoverlapping nominal
wage contracts signed over the past year. The estimated weighting scheme implies that a
weight of0.32 is placed on the current wage contract wt, while smaller weights are placed
on earlier contracts (e.g., wt−3 receives a weight ofabout 0.18).
The determination ofnominal wage contracts is given in equation (2). As in Taylor
(1980, 1993a), each wage contract is determined by expectations about aggregate prices and
perceived output gaps over the duration ofthe contract. 15 The expectations operator Et[.]
indicates the optimal projection ofeach variable, conditional on all inf ormation available at
period t. As noted above, this information set includes the true values of aggregate wages,
prices, and interest rates, and noisy observations regarding aggregate output. Since our
analysis is focused on the implications of data uncertainty regarding actual output qt,w e
assume for simplicity that potential output q∗
t is exogenously determined and known by
all private agents and by the central bank.16 Finally, under these assumptions, it should
be noted that the aggregate supply disturbance uw
t is known to all agents (including the
central bank); this implication follows from our assumptions that all agents know the current
contract wage and utilize identical information in forming expectations about the variables
on the right-hand side ofequation (2).
As shown in equation (3), the current output gap depends on the true output gap in
each ofthe previous two quarters and on the ex ante long-term real interest rate, rl
t (which
14Wages, prices, output, and money are expressed in logarithmic form, and interest rates are expressed at
annualized rates.
15Coenen and Wieland (2000) also considered relative real wage contract speciﬁcations of the type orig-
inally proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and later studied by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). We have
performed sensitivity analysis and found that the results reported here concerning the information role of
money are not substantially aﬀected by using a relative real wage contract speciﬁcation instead of equation
(2).
16In fact, equations (2) and (3) were estimated by Coenen and Wieland (2000) using “ﬁnal” data on euro
area real GDP (that is, data available at the end of 1999), and constructing the output gap by removing a
log-linear time trend. In future work, it would be interesting to reestimate these equations using real-time
output gap data. However, as the authors note, constructing a real-time output gap data series for the
period preceding EMU would be a “courageous undertaking”.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 17
Table 3: A Rational-Expectations Model with Data Uncertainty
Price Level pt = f0 wt + f1 wt−1 + f2 wt−2 + f3 wt−3,( 1 )
where fi =0 .25 + (1.5 − i)0.0456
Contract Wage wt =E t
3






where yt = qt − q∗
t and uw
t ∼ i.i.d.(0,0.00382)









t−1 − 1.052(∆πt +∆ πt−1)
−0.136[(m − p) − 1.140q
+0.820(il − is)+5 .848π]t−2
+um
t ,
where πt = pt − pt−1 and um
t ∼ i.i.d.(0,0.00232)
Monetary Policy Rule is
t =˜ πt +0 .5(˜ πt − π∗)+0 .5E t [yt], (5)



















Note: p: aggregate price level; w: nominal contract wage; uw: contract wage shock; y: output
gap; q: output; q∗: potential output; rl: long-term real interest rate; ud: aggregate demand shock;
is short-term nominal interest rate; π∗: inﬂation target; il: long-term nominal interest rate; m
nominal money balances; um: money demand shock.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 18
is deﬁned by equation (7)). This speciﬁcation seems reasonable under the assumption
that each household or ﬁrm makes spending decisions based on its own directly observed
income path, and hence aggregate spending depends on the true path ofaggregate income. 17
Nevertheless, since the true level ofaggregate output is not directly observed, the aggregate
demand shock ud
t is not in the information set of private agents or the central bank.
As indicated by equation (4), real money balances (m − p)t are determined by an error
correction process involving aggregate output qt, the short-term nominal interest rate is
t, the
long-term nominal interest rate il
t (deﬁned by equation (6)), and the one-quarter inﬂation
rate πt = pt − pt−1.18 As noted above, this money demand speciﬁcation indicates that
the money stock responds to the true level ofaggregate output qt, and hence money has a
potentially useful role as an indicator variable. Of course, this role depends on the stability
ofthe money demand. While estimates ofmoney demand with U.S. data have tended to be
unstable, results with German and euro area data have typically been more encouraging.19
Two additional characteristics ofequation (4) are crucial in determining the speciﬁc
information content of money. First, the short-run link between money and output is rel-
atively weak, with an instantaneous income elasticity ofonly 0.075; evidently, the money
stock would provide somewhat more information about current output if the contempora-
neous relationship between these two variables were signiﬁcantly larger. Second, the money
demand shock um
t has an estimated standard error of0.23 percent, reﬂecting the extent to
which money balances move in response to factors other than aggregate output, inﬂation,
and nominal interest rates. In the absence ofany additional inf ormation, private agents and
the central bank will have substantial diﬃculty in determining whether a given movement
in the money stock reﬂects a shift in aggregate output or a shift in money demand. Thus,
17To the extent that individual spending decisions actually reﬂect agents’ perceptions about the aggregate
economy, then the output gap equation would need to be augmented by terms such as Et[yt−1]a n dE t[yt−2].
We have performed some preliminary analysis of such speciﬁcations, but leave further investigation to future
research. In this context, a model with more explicit microeconomic foundations that distinguishes between
macro- and micro-level uncertainty will be helpful.
18Because the inﬂation rate πt is not annualized, the corresponding coeﬃcients in equation (4) appear
unusually large.
19For a recent study regarding U.S. money demand and money’s usefulness for U.S. monetary policy see
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as we will see below, monetary analysis may enable the central bank to identify some of the
special factors and shocks that aﬀect money demand, and thereby enhance the information
content ofmoney.
Finally, as indicated by equation (5), we assume that the monetary authorities follow
the simple interest rate rule proposed by Taylor (1993b), where ˜ πt = pt −pt−4 indicates the
annual average inﬂation rate and π∗ the inﬂation target.20 According to this equation, the
ex post short-term real interest rate moves in response to deviations ofinﬂation f rom target
and to perceived movements in the output gap (i.e., Et[yt]). Ofcourse, the central bank
would prefer to avoid making policy adjustments in response to persistent mismeasurements
ofaggregate output, and hence uses all available inf ormation in estimating the current value
ofoutput.
3.2 The Revision Process
In the state-space literature, a typical assumption is that each data point ofa given time
series is observed just once (possibly subject to some measurement error). In contrast, here
we wish to represent a sequence ofrevisions to the real output data that gradually reﬁnes
the quality ofeach individual data point. 21
A general representation ofthe revision process can be expressed as f ollows:
q
(t+j)





t is the initial observation ofoutput at time t; q
(t+j)
t is the jth revision ofthis
observation (often referred to as the time t+j “vintage” ofthe data); and v
(t+j)
t represents
the deviation from the true level of output, qt. By abstracting from deviations between
20We make this assumption, because Taylor’s rule roughly captures the systematic component of monetary
policy in a number of European countries in recent years (see for example Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1998)
and Gerlach and Schnabel (2000)). An alternative approach, would be to assume that the central bank
implements an optimal monetary policy rule in our model.
21Since our analysis is focused on the behavior of private agents and the central bank, we do not explicitly
model how the statistical agency determines these revisions, using new information on disaggregated vari-
ables, etc.. Sargent (1989) follows a diﬀerent approach, and analyses a model in which the statistical agency
uses optimal ﬁltering to revise its data on aggregate economic variables, and hence private agents and the
central bank can utilize the statistical agency’s data without any further reﬁnement.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 20
the “ﬁnal” revised data and true aggregate output, and ignoring occasional redeﬁnitional
changes in the entire time series, we may assume that the sequence ofrevisions f or each
datapoint eventually converges to the true level ofoutput; that is, v
(t+j)
t → 0a sj →∞ .
In the simplest case, the entire revision process occurs within a single quarter (that is,
v
(t+j)
t = 0 for all j>0):
q
(t)





where vt is serially uncorrelated with mean zero and standard deviation σv, and is uncor-
related with the structural disturbances ud
t, uw
t ,a n dum
t . Under this assumption about
the revision process, agents learn the true value ofoutput one period af ter the initial data
release.
As we have seen in Section 2, however, the data on real output are subject to a sequence
of substantial revisions for several quarters. Therefore, we also consider the following rep-
resentation ofthe revision process:
q
(t)

















where vt =[ v1
t v2
t v3
t ]  is a vector ofserially uncorrelated measurement errors with mean
zero and positive semi-deﬁnite covariance matrix Σvv. According to this representation of
the revision process, the period t data vintage includes error-prone observations on qt, qt−1,
and qt−2, as well as the true value of qt−3.22
We calibrate the covariance matrix of vt using the data on revisions from Section 2.23




t, respectively. The sample correlation between v1
t and v2
t is negligible, while the
sample correlations with v3
t are -0.638 for v1
t and -0.636 for v2
t. Ofcourse, given the short
22Further details regarding this representation of the revision process are provided in Appendix C.
23In constructing the sample covariance matrix, we only used data for which revisions were available for
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history ofdata revisions, the sample covariance matrix is not estimated very accurately,
and hence in the subsequent analysis we will also consider the case in which the elements
of vt are mutually uncorrelated.
4 Evaluating the Role of Indicator Variables
4.1 The Optimal Filtering Problem
We obtain optimal estimates ofoutput by applying the Kalman ﬁlter to our linear rational
expectations model ofthe euro area. Given our assumption that private agents and the
central bank have the same information concerning aggregate variables, we can follow the
approach of Svensson and Woodford (2000), henceforth referred to as SW2000.24





















where Xt is a vector ofpredetermined variables, xt is a vector ofnon- predetermined vari-
ables and ut is a vector ofserially uncorrelated shocks with mean zero and positive semi-
deﬁnite covariance matrix Σuu. The coeﬃcient matrices A1, A2 and ˜ E are matrices of
appropriate dimension. For some or many ofthe variables, policymakers and market par-













where vt is a vector ofserially uncorrelated measurement errors with mean zero and positive
semi-deﬁnite covariance matrix Σvv. The measurement errors vt are assumed to be uncorre-
lated with the shocks ut at all leads and lags, i.e. E[ut v 
τ] = 0 for all t and τ. The matrices
D1 and D2 are selector matrices ofappropriate dimension. Here we use χτ|t =E [χτ|It ]t o
denote the rational expectation (that is, the optimal projection) ofany variable χ in period
24A more detailed discussion of the Kalman ﬁlter and the weights given to indicator variables such as
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τ given information in period t. The information set in period t corresponds to
It =

Zτ,τ ≤ t;A1,A 2,D1,D2, ˜ E,Σuu,Σvv

.
SW2000 show that the non-predetermined variables fulﬁll the relationship
xt = G1 Xt + G2 Xt|t (13)
and that the system ofequations (11), (12) can be cast into state-space f orm without
non-predetermined variables,
Xt+1 = HX t + JX t|t + ut+1 (14)
Zt = LX t + MX t|t + vt, (15)
where the matrices G1, G2, H, J, L and M are derived in SW2000. This transformation of
course simpliﬁes the remaining problem off orming the estimate Xt|t considerably.25
Accounting for the contemporaneous eﬀect of the estimate Xt|t on Zt, SW2000 show that
the optimal estimate of Xt can be obtained by means ofa Kalman ﬁlter updating equation.
This updating equation is expressed in terms ofthe innovations in the transf ormed variables
¯ Zt = Zt − MX t|t:
Xt|t = Xt|t−1 + K ( ¯ Zt − ¯ Zt|t−1) (16)





The steady-state Kalman gain matrix K is given by
K = PL  (LPL  +Σ vv)−1, (18)
where the matrix P is the steady-state covariance matrix ofthe innovations Xt − Xt|t−1
given information in period t − 1 and satisﬁes the relation
P = H

P − PL  (LPL  +Σ vv)−1LP

H  +Σ uu. (19)
25Having eliminated the non- predetermined variables xt, the estimation of the predetermined variables
Xt still requires solving a simultaneity problem. Simultaneity arises because the observable variables Zt
depend on the estimate of the predetermined variables Xt|t, which in turn depend on the observables used
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We are particularly interested in the weights on the observed indicator vector Zt under
optimal ﬁltering. While the Kalman ﬁlter estimate Xt|t is obtained in terms ofthe weighted
innovations in the transformed variables ¯ Zt, we can recover the optimal weights on the
observations of Zt by substituting ¯ Zt = Zt−MX t|t and ¯ Zt|t−1 = Zt|t−1−MX t|t−1 = LX t|t−1
into (16),
Xt|t =( I + KM)−1(I − KL)Xt|t−1 +( I + KM)−1KZ t.
Here we can see that the contemporaneous eﬀect ofthe estimate Xt|t on Zt merely shows
up in the premultiplication ofthe matrix ( I + KM)−1. When comparing the weights
assigned to diﬀerent information variables in the subsequent analysis we will refer to the
elements ofthis modiﬁed Kalman gain matrix.
4.2 Measures of Information Content
We evaluate the information content of indicator variables according to the extent that
they will reduce the uncertainty surrounding the estimation ofstructural shocks and/or
prediction ofkey endogenous variables. One measure of within-period estimation uncertainty
is the covariance matrix ofthe projection errors ofthe vector Xt, given the information set
It available at period t (that is, information obtained from current and lagged values of the
observed vector Zt). As shown in Appendix B.1, this covariance matrix can be expressed
as follows:
Cov[Xt − Xt|t|It]=P − PL  (LPL  +Σ vv)−1LP. (20)
For example, one element of Xt is the unobserved aggregate demand shock, ud
t,a n d
the root mean-squared error (RMSE) ofestimating this shock is given by the square root
ofthe corresponding diagonal element ofCov[ Xt − Xt|t|It]. In the subsequent analysis the
RMSE serves as our baseline measure ofthe estimation uncertainty surrounding the optimal
estimate Xt|t produced by the application ofthe Kalman ﬁlter. To evaluate predictionECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 24
uncertainty, we will also present results regarding RMSE ofmulti-period-ahead predictions,
for which the derivations are given in Appendix B.2.
In addition to the RMSE, it is useful to consider measuring estimation uncertainty
using the concept of entropy (or “expected uncertainty”) taken from the information theory
literature. In doing so we follow Tinsley et al. (1980) who employ entropy as a formal
measure ofthe inf ormation content ofindicator variables. To explain the basic concept
and its relationship with the coeﬃcient ofdetermination in linear regression models, R2,
we restate the relevant general results from Tinsley et al..26
Consider two vectors χ and ξ with joint density f(χ,ξ). The joint entropy of χ and ξ is
given by
H(χ,ξ)=−E[ln(f(χ,ξ))].
The entropy or ’expected uncertainty’ of χ corresponds to
H(χ)=−E[ln(f(χ))],
where f(χ) is the marginal density of χ, and the entropy of χ given ξ corresponds to
H(χ|ξ)=−E[ln(f(χ|ξ))]
with f(χ|ξ)=f(χ,ξ)/f(ξ) denoting the conditional density of χ given ξ. Since H(χ)
corresponds to the prior uncertainty associated with χ and the observation ξ may provide
additional information with f(χ|ξ) describing what is known about χ after having observed
ξ, H(χ|ξ) reﬂects the posterior uncertainty about χ given ξ. The expected information
ofthe observation ξ with respect to χ is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the prior
uncertainty about χ, H(χ), and the posterior uncertainty of χ given ξ, H(χ|ξ),
I(χ|ξ)=H(χ) − H(χ|ξ).
Using this measure of information content one can derive the expected relative informa-
tion gain associated with adding a particular indicator variable ζ to the information vector
26For early uses of the concept of entropy in the economics literature see also Theil (1967).ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 25
ξ as follows:
G(χ,ξ,ζ)=[ I(χ|ξ,ζ) − I(χ|ξ)]/I(χ|ξ).
Regarding χ and ξ as jointly distributed normal with covariance matrix Σ, Tinsley et
al. show that I(χ|ξ) has a particularly simple form. In this case, using the properties of
multivariate normal distributions,
I(χ|ξ)=0 .5l n (|Σχχ|/|Σχχ − Σχξ Σ−1
ξξ Σξχ|),
where Σχχ,Σ ξξ and Σχξ =Σ  
ξχ are the submatrices ofΣ with appropriate dimensions and
Σχχ−Σχξ Σ−1
ξξ Σξχ is the conditional covariance matrix of χ given ξ. Thus, under normality,
the measure ofinf ormation content, I(χ|ξ), corresponds to the log-distance between the
determinants ofthe covariance matrices ofthe marginal and the conditional distribution of
χ.
The case ofunivariate χ can then be used to develop an intuitive interpretation ofthe
expected information content I(χ|ξ). In this case,
I(χ|ξ)=0 .5l n (σ2
χ/(σ2
χ − Σχξ Σ−1
ξξ Σξχ))
=0 .5l n (1 /(1 − β Σξξβ/σ2
χ))
=0 .5l n (1 /(1 − R2
χ|ξ)),
where β is the vector ofregression coeﬃcients, and R2
χ|ξ is the population coeﬃcient of
determination in the linear regression of χ on ξ.E v i d e n t l y ,
R2
χ|ξ =1 − (exp{2I(χ|ξ)})
−1 .
To adapt these measures to our euro area model with rational expectations and data
uncertainty, we need to obtain the joint distribution ofthe innovations in the observed
indicator variables and the innovations in the predetermined variables. This is done in
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5 Illustrating the Information Role of Money
We have now assembled the tools necessary to assess the contribution ofmoney in the
estimation ofnoisy output data and the underlying shocks. To illustrate the inf ormation
role ofmoney, we start with the case in which output revisions occur within a single period
(as speciﬁed in equation (9)). Furthermore, we utilize the following highly stylized money
demand f unction in place ofthe more complicated dynamic speciﬁcation ofCoenen and
Vega (1999) that was presented in section 3:
mt − pt = qt + um
t , (21)
where the exogenous disturbance um
t is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero
and standard deviation σ(um).
As discussed in Section 3, we assume that money demand evolves in response to the
true level of output, and hence can serve as a useful indicator variable. In fact, under
our assumption that aggregate prices are known by all agents, money would be a perfect
indicator oftrue output in the limiting case with no money demand shocks ( σ(um) = 0). On
the other hand, of course, money would provide no useful additional information if output
were observed without measurement error (σ(v) = 0).
More generally, the role ofmoney as an indicator variable will depend on the relative
magnitude ofmoney demand shocks compared with output measurement errors. As pre-
viously noted, contract wage shocks are known by all agents in our model,27 so that the
key information problem is to determine whether a given movement in output is due to an
aggregate demand shock or to measurement error. Thus, in this section, we will evaluate the
information content of money based on its contribution in estimating the current aggregate
demand shock, ud
t.
27This implication follows from our assumptions that all agents know the current contract wage and utilize
identical information in forming expectations about the variables on the right-hand side of equation (2).ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 27
5.1 The Economy without Money
As a benchmark for comparison, we begin with the special case in which money is not in the
information set, or equivalently, the variance of money demand shocks is arbitrarily large.
Figure 2 summarizes the characteristics of the information problem for a range of values of
the standard deviation ofthe output measurement error, σ(v). The upper-left panel shows
the optimal ﬁlter weights on the noisy observation ofcurrent output ( qt + vt), as well as
the true values ofinﬂation ( πt) and lagged output (qt−1). The upper-right panel indicates
the root mean-squared error (RMSE) ofthe estimate ud
t|t ofthe current aggregate demand
shock, and the lower panel indicates the R2 ofa regression of ud
t on the vector ofobserved
variables.
Evidently, when output is measured without error (σ(v) = 0), the aggregate demand
shock can be determined exactly as a function of the observed variables; that is, the RMSE
equals zero and the R2 equals unity. As the standard deviation ofthe measurement errors
increases, the optimal ﬁlter places lower weight on the noisy observation ofcurrent output
(similarly on lagged output and inﬂation), the RMSE rises while the R2 falls. Finally, as
noted in Section 3.2, the ﬁrst-quarter revisions ofeuro area output have a sample standard
deviation of0.97 percent. As σ(v) approaches this value, we see that the RMSE rises to
about 0.5 percent (still a bit lower than the unconditional standard deviation of0.58 percent
for the aggregate demand shock), while the R2 falls below 25 percent.
Figure 3 shows the behavior ofthis economy in response to a single aggregate demand
shock ofone standard deviation (which occurs at time 0). The solid line indicates the
response ofeach variable under the baseline calibration ( σ(v)=0 .97 percent), while the dot-
dashed line indicates the corresponding path when output is not subject to measurement
errors (σ(v) = 0). Finally, in the upper-left panel, the dotted line indicates the path of
perceived output in response to the shock.
Ofcourse, the aggregate demand shock immediately raises the level ofreal output. In
this case, the reported level ofoutput happens to be exactly correct, but the optimal ﬁlterECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 28
Figure 2: Optimal Filtering ofthe Aggregate Demand Shock without Money
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causes private agents and the central bank to downweight this observation. Thus, contract
wages and aggregate inﬂation respond slightly less than ifoutput were not subject to mea-
surement errors. More importantly, the central bank does not raise short-term nominal
interest rates as quickly, and hence actual output rises more sharply and takes somewhat
longer to return to potential. Based on these impulse responses, it is evident why indicator
variables such as money can serve a useful role when output observations are noisy.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 29
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5.2 The Information Role of Money
We now consider the extent to which money can provide a more accurate estimate ofthe
current aggregate demand shock. Since the contribution ofmoney depends both on the
standard deviations ofthe output measurement error and the money demand shock we
report the results in a set ofthree-dimensional graphs. In each panel, the two axes in the
horizontal plane denote the standard deviation ofthe measurement error on output σ(v)
and the standard deviation ofthe money demand shock σ(um).
The top four panels of Figure 4 indicate the weights (measured on the vertical axis) on
the noisy current output observation q
(t)
t , as well as the true values oflagged output qt−1,
inﬂation πt, and money growth µt = mt − mt−1.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 30
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With regard to the weights on current and lagged output and inﬂation as a function of
the output measurement error, we conﬁrm the ﬁndings for the case without money. As the
measurement error regarding output increases the weights assigned to noisy current output,
lagged output and inﬂation decrease (in absolute terms). This is the case for any level of
the standard deviation ofthe money demand shock as can be seen by moving f rom right to
left along the dimension which corresponds to the output measurement error.
We ﬁnd that money can play an important role in estimating the current aggregate
demand shock ifthe relative magnitude ofthe money demand shock is not too large. Not
surprisingly, the weight assigned to money is largest in the absence ofmoney demand shocks
(that is, σ(um) = 0). In this case, the decision maker can infer the true value of output
(and consequently, the aggregate demand shock) directly from the money growth rate, since
lagged output and inﬂation are observed exactly.
As σ(um) increases, however, the weight on money growth in the optimal estimate of
output declines. With the possibility ofmoney demand shocks, the decision maker cannot
be sure whether a money growth observation that seems inconsistent with observed output
is an indication ofa mismeasurement ofactual output or ofa money demand shock. While
the weight on money declines, one can see that it declines more slowly the greater the
standard deviation ofthe output measurement error. Finally, it is ofinterest to note that
the weight on inﬂation and lagged output also decreases in absolute value with the weight
on money, as the standard deviation ofthe money demand shock increases.
The bottom two panels of Figure 4 show the degree ofuncertainty associated with the
contemporaneous estimate ofthe aggregate demand shock, as indicated by the RMSE and
the R2. Ofcourse, along either axis in the horizontal plane, the RMSE is zero and the R2
is equal to one, because either σ(v)o rσ(um) equals zero. When both σ(v)a n dσ(um)a r e
strictly positive, the RMSE is positive and the R2 is less than unity.
Figure 5 indicates three measures ofthe inf ormation content ofmoney in estimating the
aggregate demand shock: the reduction in RMSE (in percentage points), the improvement
in R2, and the expected relative gain in information G. When output measurement errorsECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 32
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are relatively large compared with money demand shocks (that is, σ(v) > 0.5 percent and
σ(um) < 0.5 percent), the improvement in the quality ofthe estimate can be substantial:
in such cases, money reduces the RMSE by 20 percent or more and raises the R2 by at
least 0.18. The information gain from utilizing money as an information variable is also
very high under these conditions.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 33
6 The Quantitative Signiﬁcance of Money as an Indicator
Variable
Having illustrated the role ofmoney in a somewhat simpliﬁed model, we now proceed to
quantify the information content of money using the full model given in Section 3. In
particular, we utilize the empirical money demand equation given in equation (4) with the
estimated standard deviation ofthe money demand shock, and we consider two variants of
the 3-quarter output revision process given in equation (10), as well as the simpler 1-quarter
revision process (given by equation (9)) that was used in the previous section.
6.1 Results for the Baseline Estimated Model
6.1.1 The Optimal Indicator Weights
Table 4 indicates the optimal weight on each indicator variable used in estimating the
current aggregate demand shock, ud
t. The upper panel shows these weights when money
is not included in the information set, while the lower panel indicates the weights when
current money growth is utilized in constructing the optimal estimate. In each case, we
consider three alternative assumptions about the output revision process.
When the revision process is completed in a single period, the previous period’s output
is known with certainty (that is, q
(t)
t−1 = qt−1). In this case, longer lags ofoutput do not
contain any additional information regarding the period t aggregate demand shock. Thus,
as shown by the ﬁrst row ofthe upper panel, the optimal ﬁlter places non-zero weight on
the noisy current output observation q
(t)
t , the previous period’s output level qt−1, and the
current inﬂation rate πt. (As noted previously, we are assuming that current inﬂation is
known by all agents and hence can always serve as a perfect indicator variable.)
In contrast, when the revision process takes three periods, the current and previous two
output observations contain measurement error, while the true value of qt−3 is revealed in
the latest data vintage. Hence, in this case, the optimal ﬁlter places non-zero weight on all








t−3) as well as the current inﬂation
rate. The second row ofthe upper panel shows the optimal weights when the revisions areECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 34











One-Period 0.267 -0.309 0 0 0.022 —
Three-Period Uncorrelated 0.136 -0.059 -0.054 -0.021 0.011 —
Three-Period Correlated 0.271 -0.127 -0.054 0.016 0.022 —
Filtering with Money
One-Period 0.265 -0.268 0 0 0.044 0.354
Three-Period Uncorrelated 0.138 -0.053 -0.081 -0.052 0.035 0.387
Three-Period Correlated 0.275 -0.115 -0.089 0.012 0.046 0.374
uncorrelated but their variances are set to the estimated values described in Section 3.2.,
while the third row indicates the weights when we use the complete estimated covariance
matrix.
When current money growth is included in the information set, we see that this indicator
variable receives substantial weight in estimating the current aggregate demand shock. The
exact weight varies somewhat depending on the speciﬁc representation ofthe output revision
process, but the notable point is that the magnitude ofthis weight is roughly similar to that
placed on the noisy current output observation. Ofcourse, interpreting the speciﬁc pattern
ofﬁltering weights is rather diﬃcult, and hence we now proceed to consider the measures
ofinf ormation content described in Section 4.2.
6.1.2 Measures ofInf ormation Content
Table 5 characterizes the information role of money in estimating the current aggregate
demand shock under each ofthe three alternative assumptions about the revision process.
As a benchmark for comparison, the ﬁrst two columns indicate the RMSE of the demandECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 35
Table 5: The Information Role of Money in the Estimated Model
Information Content
Revision Process RMSE R2 %∆RMSE ∆R2 Info. Gain
One-Period 0.50 0.26 -1.29 0.02 8.51
Three-Period Uncorrelated 0.54 0.13 -1.46 0.03 20.42
Three-Period Correlated 0.50 0.27 -1.59 0.02 10.29
shock estimate (that is, the square root ofE t[ud
t|t−ud
t]2) and the associated R2 when money
growth is not included in the information set. Evidently, the precision of the demand shock
estimates is not very high regardless ofhow the output revision process is speciﬁed.
The remainder of Table 5 provides three measures ofthe extent to which current money
growth increases the precision ofthe estimated demand shock. By including money as an
indicator variable, the RMSE is reduced by about 1.5 percent, and the R2 rises by about
0.02. Measured in terms oflower entropy, the inf ormation gain is somewhat more impressive:
about 10 to 20 percent, depending on the speciﬁcation ofthe output revision process.
Based on these results, one would reasonably conclude that money has noticeable but
not remarkably high information content in estimating the current aggregate demand shock.
However, our analysis thus far has assumed that the central bank is unable to identify any
ofthe underlying f actors that generate the contemporaneous money demand shock. As
we will see below, monetary analysis can dramatically raise the usefulness of money as an
indicator variable.
6.2 The Role of Monetary Analysis
Central banks tend to expend signiﬁcant resources to gain a better understanding ofongoing
monetary developments on a very detailed level, thereby identifying factors that would not
be well-explained by a standard money demand model. This function of monetary analysisECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 36
is highlighted in the May 2001 issue ofthe ECB Monthly Bulletin:
“The decomposition of monetary growth into its macroeconomic determinants
also indicates the extent to which monetary growth is not explained by the [money
demand] model. Hence it may reveal additional information contained in mone-
tary aggregates which is not captured by the other macroeconomic variables. ...
Ideally, a detailed institutional analysis can provide some additional insight by
providing information concerning special events, thus reducing the unexplained
part of monetary growth.” [ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2001, pp. 46/47.]
The results reported in Table 6 indicate that monetary analysis can play an important
role in enhancing the information role of money when contemporaneous output estimates
are aﬄicted by substantial measurement error. In the ﬁrst column, the standard deviation
ofthe money demand shock σ(um) is equal to the estimated value from Coenen and Vega
(1999). In the remaining three columns, we assume that monetary analysis is able to identify
factors accounting for a substantial fraction of the variation in the money demand shock.
In such cases, the information content of current money growth increases dramatically.
When monetary analysis is able to identify factors accounting for 75 percent of the
variance ofthe money demand shock, then utilizing money as an indicator variable reduces
the RMSE ofthe current aggregate demand shock estimate by about 10 to 15 percent, while
the associated R2 rises by about 0.2, and the entropy measure ofinf ormation increases by
more than 100 percent. When the central bank succeeds in identifying the factors that
account for 7/8 of the money demand shock, then the RMSE is reduced by 30 to 40 percent;
the other measures ofinf ormation content also rise dramatically in this case.
When monetary analysis is relatively eﬀective, we also ﬁnd that current money growth
provides substantial beneﬁts in predicting future levels of output.28 To illustrate this beneﬁt,
we consider the case in which the central bank can identify factors that account for three-
fourths of the variation in the money demand shock. The underlying output revision process
28Table D1 in Appendix D indicates the RMSE of output and inﬂation forecasts for the case in which
output is measured without error.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 37
Table 6: Monetary Analysis and the Information Content of Money
Reduction in the
Information Revision
Std. Dev. ofthe Money Demand Shock
Measure Process 0% 50% 75% 82.5%
%∆RMSE One-Period -1.29 -4.88 -16.13 -38.99
Three-Period Uncorrelated -1.46 -4.69 -11.91 -26.01
Three-Period Correlated -1.59 -5.41 -14.41 -28.77
∆R2 One-Period 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.46
Three-Period Uncorrelated 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.39
Three-Period Correlated 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.36
Information One-Period 8.51 32.79 115.12 323.36
Gain Three-Period Uncorrelated 20.42 66.81 176.11 418.47
Three-Period Correlated 10.29 36.05 100.58 219.55
is assumed to take three periods with the revisions being correlated. The ﬁrst column of
Table 7 indicates the RMSE ofthe output prediction f or a range off orecast horizons when
money growth is not included in the information set, while the fourth column indicates the
reduction in RMSE that results from utilizing money as an indicator variable. Evidently,
money growth enhances the precision ofthe contemporaneous output estimate by about
5 percent, and improves the accuracy ofthe two-quarter-ahead output f orecast by about
2 percent. Ofcourse, as the f orecast horizon increases, output exhibits a higher degree of
unpredictable variation, and hence no indicator variable would be expected to have very
much predictive power.
As discussed in Appendix B.2, the MSE can be decomposed into a component which
relates to the within-period estimation error ofthe predetermined variables (component
I), and the propagation ofunpredictable f uture disturbances which will aﬀect the evolu-
tion ofthe predetermined variables as well as their within-period estimates in the f uture
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Table 7: The Role ofMoney in Predicting Output
Forecast RMSE %∆RMSE
Horizon Overall I II Overall I II
0 0.56 0.56 0 -5.42 -5.42 0
1 0.84 0.62 0.57 -3.44 -5.97 -0.57
2 1.05 0.59 0.87 -2.25 -6.14 -0.52
4 1.33 0.50 1.24 -1.32 -6.15 -0.55
8 1.60 0.34 1.56 -0.83 -6.15 -0.59
16 1.75 0.15 1.74 -0.65 -6.15 -0.61
unconditional standard deviation ofoutput. The contribution to the RMSE coming f rom
component I dominates initially but has a declining contribution to the overall RMSE as
the forecast horizon increases.
Turning to the ﬁnal two columns of Table 7, we see that using money as an indicator
variable causes a 6 percent reduction in the RMSE associated with component I, regardless
of the forecast horizon. It is interesting to note that having money in the information set
also changes the dynamic behavior ofactual output, and hence has a small eﬀect in reducing
the RMSE associated with component II.29
6.3 Further Sensitivity Analysis
Now we brieﬂy summarize some additional sensitivity analysis regarding the results pre-
sented above.
First, it is worthwhile to consider the implications ofalternative money demand speciﬁ-
cations with a stronger contemporaneous relationship between money and output. For the
preceding analysis, we have used the demand function for M3 because this money aggregate
has exhibited reasonable stability in the euro area over the past two decades (cf. Coenen
29Results regarding inﬂation prediction are given in Table D2 of Appendix D. With regard to inﬂation,
component I is not very important. Even though component I decreases by including money growth in the
information set, component II actually increases slightly. With regard to the overall MSE money growth
does not help as a result. Of course, one needs to keep in mind that the information role of money for
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and Vega (1999)). However, the estimated coeﬃcient that determines the instantaneous
income elasticity ofM3 is rather small. Narrower money aggregates (such as M1) typically
have a much tighter relationship with current output. As shown in Table D3 ofAppendix
D, we ﬁnd that a higher instantaneous income elasticity substantially raises the informa-
tion content ofmoney. Thus, to the extent that monetary analysis can identif y structural
changes and special factors that generate shifts in the demand function for a narrow aggre-
gate (such as M1), the central bank would be able to utilize such an aggregate in reducing
the data uncertainty associated with current output.
Second, we have assumed for simplicity that private agents and the central bank are
able to utilize a noisy estimate ofcontemporaneous output at each point in time. Given
the actual time delays in releasing GDP data, however, it may be more realistic to assume
that no output estimate is available until the subsequent period (especially since our model
is speciﬁed at a quarterly frequency). As shown in Appendix Tables D4 and D5, the
importance ofusing money as an indicator variable increases in this case.
Finally, the results reported above have been derived using a structural macroeconomic
model. This approach provides a clear description ofthe transmission mechanism ofmon-
etary policy, and explicitly considers the evolution ofmarket participants’ expectations.
Nevertheless, we recognize that structural assumptions are always somewhat controversial.
Therefore, we have also measured the information content of money using the non-structural
time series model ofthe euro area estimated by Coenen and Vega (1999). As shown in Ap-
pendix Tables D6 through D9, the implications ofthe time series model are remarkably
similar to those ofthe structural macroeconometric model.
7 Conclusion
To explore the inf ormation role ofmoney in the presence ofdata uncertainty we have ex-
tended the euro area macroeconomic model ofCoenen and Wieland (2000) by incorporating
the euro area-wide money demand model ofCoenen and Vega (1999) and an empirically cal-
ibrated model ofthe revision process ofaggregate euro area output. Using this f rameworkECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 40
we have found that money can play an important role as an information variable and may
result in major improvements in current output estimates. However, the speciﬁc nature of
this role depends on the magnitude ofthe output measurement error relative to the money
demand shock.
In particular, we have found noticable but small improvements in output estimates due
to the inclusion ofmoney growth in the inf ormation set when the standard deviation of
money demand shocks equals the estimated value from Coenen and Vega (1999). Money
plays a quantitatively more important role with regard to output estimation ifwe allow f or
a contribution ofmonetary analysis in reducing uncertainty due to money demand shocks.
In this case, money also helps to reduce uncertainty about output forecasts. Of course, as
the construction ofeuro area aggregate output data is improved over time, the magnitude
ofthe revisions discussed in Section 2 is likely to decline over time. Nevertheless, evidence
concerning U.S. data vintages collected by Croushore and Stark (1999) indicates that data
uncertainty will remain an important issue even once the data collection technology has
matured.
Throughout the paper we consider a relatively limited role ofmoney by f ocusing ex-
clusively on the information content of money with respect to output measurement and by
excluding the possibility ofa direct role ofmoney in output and inﬂation determination. In
this sense, our quantitative results only indicate a lower bound on the usefulness of money.
An alternative model that allows for signiﬁcant direct eﬀects of money on inﬂation and
could be used in future research is the so-called P∗ model.
Also, as noted earlier, we have focused attention on a framework with symmetric in-
formation regarding aggregate output data as far as private market participants and the
central bank are concerned. We have also conducted some exploratory analysis under the
assumption ofasymmetric inf ormation regarding aggregate data that is used by Dotsey and
Hornstein (2000) and Svensson and Woodford (2001). However, in our view this assump-
tion is undesirable ifit implies that a representative agent by knowing his individual income
can also infer aggregate income and demand while the policymaker only observes a noisyECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 41
estimate ofaggregate demand. We plan to study the asymmetric case in more detail in the
future in a model that would allow us to diﬀerentiate more carefully between individual and
aggregate uncertainty.
Finally, another interesting avenue for future research would be to compare optimal
ﬁltering to simple ﬁltering rules in keeping with the recent debate on optimal versus simple
monetary policy rules. For example, one could investigate the performance of simple rules
that respond only to observed output growth, inﬂation and money growth instead ofoptimal
estimates ofthe output gap. A recent study that considers an example ofa simple ﬁltering
rule in the context ofNAIRU uncertainty is Meyer, Swanson and Wieland (2001).ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 42
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Appendix A Kalman ﬁltering ` a la Svensson and Woodford
This appendix restates and specializes the setup ofSvensson and Woodf ord (2000) – hence-
forth SW – so that the Kalman ﬁlter can be applied to the variants of the wage contracting
models analysed in the main text. In particular, we now work with a generic linear rational
expectations model and a model ofmeasurement which permit us to f ormulate the wage
contracting models in state-space form to which the Kalman ﬁlter is applicable.
A.1 The state-space representation





















where Xt is a vector ofpredetermined variables, xt is a vector ofnon-predetermined variables
and ut is a vector ofserially uncorrelated shocks with mean zero and positive semi-deﬁnite
covariance matrix Σuu. The coeﬃcient matrices A1, A2 and ˜ E are matrices ofappropriate
dimension.
Regarding the measurement ofthe predetermined and non-predetermined variables, let












where vt is a vector ofserially uncorrelated measurement errors with mean zero and pos-
itive semi-deﬁnite covariance matrix Σvv. The measurement errors vt are assumed to be
uncorrelated with the shocks ut at all leads and lags, i.e. E[ut v 
τ] = 0 for all t and τ. The
matrices D1 and D2 are selector matrices ofappropriate dimension.
Information in period t is supposed to be given by
It =

Zτ,τ ≤ t;A1,A 2,D1,D2, ˜ E,Σuu,Σvv

and we let χτ|t =E [ χτ|It ] denote the rational expectation ofany variable χ in period τ
given information in period t.
SW show that the non-predetermined variables fulﬁll the relationship
xt = G1 Xt + G2 Xt|t (A.3)
and that the system ofequations (A.1), (A.2) can be cast into state-space f orm without
non-predetermined variables,
Xt+1 = HX t + JX t|t + ut+1 (A.4)
Zt = LX t + MX t|t + vt, (A.5)
where the matrices G1, G2, H, J, L and M are provided in SW.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 46
This transformation turns out to simplify the remaining problem of forming the estimate
Xt|t considerably.
A.2 The Kalman ﬁlter
After having eliminated the non-predetermined variables xt there is a simultaneity prob-
lem to be solved when estimating the predetermined variables Xt because the observable
variables Zt depend on the estimate ofthe predetermined variables Xt|t, while the latter
depends on the observables used in the estimation.
Accounting for the contemporaneous eﬀect of the estimate Xt|t on Zt, SW show that
the optimal estimate of Xt can be obtained by a Kalman ﬁlter updating equation in terms
ofthe innovations in the transf ormed variables ¯ Zt = Zt − MX t|t,
Xt|t = Xt|t−1 + K ( ¯ Zt − ¯ Zt|t−1)( A . 6 )





where the second line uses that ¯ Zt − ¯ Zt|t−1 = L(Xt − Xt|t−1)+vt.30
The steady-state Kalman gain matrix K is given by
K = PL  (LPL  +Σ vv)−1, (A.8)
where the matrix P is the steady-state covariance matrix ofthe innovations Xt − Xt|t−1
given information in period t − 1 and fulﬁlls31
P = H

P − PL  (LPL  +Σ vv)−1LP

H  +Σ uu. (A.9)
In section B.1 below it is veriﬁed that the term in square brackets is the covariance
matrix ofthe updating errors Xt −Xt|t given information in period t, which may serve as a
measure ofthe estimation uncertainty surrounding the optimal estimate Xt|t produced by
the application ofthe Kalman ﬁlter.
The evolution over time ofthe predetermined variables Xt and their estimates Xt|t is
simultaneously determined by the transition equation (A.4) and the Kalman ﬁlter updating
equation (A.7) in combination with the prediction formula Xt|t−1 =( H +J)Xt−1|t−1 being
derived from the former.























30Note that ¯ Zt = Zt−MX t|t = LX t+vt and ¯ Zt|t−1 = Zt|t−1−MX t|t−1 = LX t|t−1, and thus ¯ Zt− ¯ Zt|t−1 =
L(Xt − Xt|t−1)+vt.
31Note that (LPL
  +Σ vv)
−1 may be replaced by a generalized inverse if (LPL
  +Σ vv) is singular.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 47
Appendix B Measuring the information content of indicator
variables
To evaluate the information content of indicator variables, we assess to which extent indica-
tor measurements will reduce the uncertainty surrounding the estimation and/or prediction
ofvariables ofinterest such as output and inﬂation. To do so, we build on a measure f rom
information theory, the entropy, to evaluate the within-period estimation uncertainty and
compute the Mean Square Error (MSE) ofmulti-period ahead predictions to evaluate the
prediction uncertainty. In section B.1 and section B.2 below, we show how to properly
adapt the necessary computations to the generic linear rational expectations model with
imperfectly observed indicator variables.
B.1 Within-period estimation
Drawing on results from information theory, Tinsley et al. (1980) employ the entropy, or
‘expected uncertainty’, as a formal measure of the information content of indicator variables.
We have restated the relevant results in Tinsley et al. in the main text and adapt them here
to the generic linear rational expectations model with imperfect indicator measurements.
In order to do so we need to obtain the joint distribution ofthe innovations in the ob-
served indicator variables, Zt − Zt|t−1, and the innovations in the predetermined variables,
Xt − Xt|t−1. As an intermediate step, we ﬁrst consider the case ofthe transf ormed indi-
cator variables ¯ Zt ≡ Zt − MX t|t, where the contemporaneous eﬀect ofthe estimate Xt|t is
subtracted from the observed variables Zt.
Assuming that the shocks ut and the measurement errors vt are normal and that the
steady-state covariance matrix P from the application of the Kalman ﬁlter is given, it is
straightforward to show that the innovations in the transformed indicators, ¯ Zt− ¯ Zt|t−1,a n d
the innovations in the predetermined variables, Xt−Xt|t−1, are jointly normally distributed
with

¯ Zt − ¯ Zt|t−1
Xt − Xt|t−1












where we recall that ¯ Zt − ¯ Zt|t−1 = L(Xt − Xt|t−1)+vt and P =C o v [ Xt − Xt|t−1|It−1].
Then, observing that the innovations in the observed indicators are a linear transforma-
tion ofthe innovations in the transf ormed indicators, Zt−Zt|t−1 =( I+MK)(¯ Zt− ¯ Zt|t−1),32
32Notice that
Zt − Zt|t−1 = Zt − MX t|t + MX t|t − Zt|t−1 − MX t|t−1 + MX t|t−1
= ¯ Zt − ¯ Zt|t−1 + M (Xt|t − Xt|t−1)
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it follows immediately from (B.1) that the innovations in the observed indicators and the











N(LPL  +Σ vv)N  NLP




where N = I + MK.
Hence, using the properties ofmultivariate normal distributions, the conditional covari-
ance matrix of Xt − Xt|t−1 given information in period t is
Cov[Xt − Xt|t−1|It]=C o v [ Xt − Xt|t−1|It−1,Z t − Zt|t−1]
= P − PL N 


N(LPL  +Σ vv)−1N 
 
NLP
= P − PL (LPL  +Σ vv)−1LP. (B.2)
Apparently, while the weights ofthe observed indicator variables Zt in computing the
conditional mean Xt|t =E [ Xt|It] are aﬀected by the contemporaneous eﬀect of Xt|t on Zt
(as shown below), the computation ofthe conditional covariance Cov[ Xt −Xt|t−1|It] is not.
Indeed, the conditional covariance matrix Cov[Xt − Xt|t−1|It] is equal to the conditional
covariance matrix Cov[Xt − Xt|t−1| ¯ Zt − ¯ Zt|t−1,I t−1] which can be obtained from (B.1).
In principle, one could also aim at measuring the information content of indicator vari-
ables starting from the covariance matrices of the innovations in the non-predetermined
variables,
xt − xt|t−1 = G1 (Xt − Xt|t−1)+G2 (Xt|t − Xt|t−1)
= G1(Xt − Xt|t−1)+G2K [L(Xt − Xt|t−1)+vt]
=( G1 + G2KL)(Xt − Xt|t−1)+G2Kv t,
where we have used equations (A.3) and (A.7).
However, since the covariance matrix of xt−xt|t−1 given information in period t−1 will
depend on the choice ofthe vector ofindicator variables via the Kalman gain matrix K
and the covariance matrix ofthe measurement errors Σ vv, it will not be feasible to measure
the information content of the indicator variables by measuring the distance between the
covariance matrices of xt − xt|t−1 given information in t and t − 1, respectively, since a
simultaneity problem, entering via K and Σvv, exists.
Finally, since Cov[Xt − Xt|t|It]=C o v [ Xt − Xt|t−1|It],33 equation (B.2) also provides
a measure ofthe estimation uncertainty surrounding the optimal estimate Xt|t produced
=( I + MK)(¯ Zt − ¯ Zt|t−1)
where the step from the second line to the third makes use of the Kalman ﬁlter updating equation (A.7)
and the step from the third to the fourth uses the relationship shown in footnote 30.
33Observing that
Cov[Xt − Xt|t|It]=C o v [ ( Xt − Xt|t) − (Xt|t − Xt|t−1)|It]ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 49
by the application ofthe Kalman ﬁlter, i.e. the covariance matrix ofthe updating error
Xt − Xt|t.
B.2 Multi-period predictions
When evaluating the information content of individual indicator variables it is also of interest
to asses to which extent the indicator variables may reduce the uncertainty surrounding
the multi-period predictions ofvariables ofinterest such as output and inﬂation. To this
end this section shows how to compute the Mean Square Error (MSE) ofthe h-period
ahead predictions ofthe predetermined and non-predetermined variables in linear rational
expectations models when the indicator variables are subject to measurement error. In
particular, it is shown that the MSE can be decomposed in a component which relates
to the within-period estimation error ofthe predetermined variables and the propagation
ofunpredictable f uture disturbances which will aﬀect the evolution ofthe predetermined
variables as well as their within-period estimates in the future. In general, the magnitude
ofboth components depends on the system matrices describing the joint dynamics ofthe
predetermined variables and their within-period estimates.
To simplify the calculations we restate the dynamic system (A.10) describing the joint
evolution ofthe vector ofpredetermined variables Xt and its within-period estimate Xt|t
more compactly as
Yt+1 = AY t + Bw t+1 (B.3)
with Yt =[X 
t,X  
t|t ] , wt =[u 
t,v  
t ]  and appropriately deﬁned matrices A and B.
Then, iterating the dynamic system (B.3) forward, we can express the realisation in
period t + h, Yt+h, in terms ofthe current realisation Yt and the future disturbances
wt+1,...,w t+h,




The h-period ahead prediction Yt+h|t, given the available information in period t,i s
Yt+h|t = Ah Yt|t
=C o v [ ( Xt − Xt|t) − KL[(Xt|t − Xt|t−1)+vt ]|It]
=C o v [ ( I − KL)(Xt − Xt|t−1) − Kv t|It]
=( I − KL)P (I − KL)
  + K Σvv K
 
with P =C o v [ Xt − Xt|t−1|It−1]a n dK = PL
  (LPL
  +Σ vv)
−1, we obtain after some algebra
Cov[Xt − Xt|t|It]=P − PL
 (LPL
  +Σ vv)
−1LP
=C o v [ Xt − Xt|t−1|It].ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 50
and, thus, the h-period ahead prediction error amounts to
Yt+h − Yt+h|t = Ah (Yt − Yt|t)+
h−1 
i=0
Ai Bw t+h−i. (B.4)
Observing that















(Xt − Xt|t)( B . 5 )
it follows that the h-period ahead prediction error (B.4) has two sources: ﬁrst, the within-
period prediction error ofthe predetermined variables, Xt − Xt|t; and, second, the unpre-
dictable future disturbances wt+1,...,w t+h. Obviously, the impact ofthe within-period
estimation error Xt −Xt|t dies out with increasing prediction horizon h since Ah converges
to zero with increasing h given that all eigenvalues of A have modulus less than one.
Since
Xt − Xt|t = HX t−1 + JX t−1|t−1 + ut
−

KLH Xt−1 +( ( I − KL)H + J)Xt−1|t−1 + KLu t + Kv t

=( I − KL)H (Xt−1 − Xt−1|t−1)+[( I − KL) − K ]wt
we can express Xt − Xt|t as the weighted sum ofcurrent and past disturbances by solving
the above equation backwards,
Xt − Xt|t =
∞ 
i=0
[(I − KL)H ]
i [(I − KL) − K ]wt−i. (B.6)
Then, combining (B.5) and (B.6) with (B.4), we can express the h-period ahead predic-
tion error Yt+h − Yt+h|t as a weighted sum ofpast, current and f uture disturbances,






[(I − KL)H ]




Since Yt−Yt|t is uncorrelated with wt+h−i,fo r h−i>0, the MSE matrix ofthe h-period
ahead prediction Yt+h|t is
MSE[Yt+h|t ]=E

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for t = τ and 0 else.
The ﬁrst term ofthe MSE matrix vanishes f or h →∞since the impact ofthe within-
period estimation error dies out with increasing prediction horizon h.34 By contrast, the
second term is monotonically non-decreasing and for h →∞it approaches the unconditional
covariance matrix of Yt. It is interesting to note that, even ifthe ﬁrst term ofthe overall
MSE matrix has vanished, the second term and, ultimately, the unconditional variance of
Yt will generally be aﬀected by the choice ofindicator variables via the Kalman gain matrix
K and the covariance matrix ofthe measurement errors Σ vv. In particular, this will hold
true for the h-period ahead predictions ofthe predetermined variables Xt unless J  = 0, i.e.
unless the dynamic system in Xt and Xt|t is decoupled.
Once we have determined the MSE matrix ofthe h-period ahead prediction Yt+h|t,
we can easily recover the MSE matrix ofthe h-period ahead prediction ofthe vectors
ofpredetermined and non-predetermined variables, Xt+h|t and xt+h|t, from the former.
Obviously, the MSE matrix ofthe h-period ahead f orecast ofthe vector ofpredetermined
variables, MSE[Xt+h|t ], is the upper left block of MSE[Yt+h|t ].
To obtain the MSE matrix ofthe h-period ahead forecast of the vector of non-
predetermined variables, MSE[xt+h|t ], we recall that xt = G1 Xt + G2 Xt|t. Thus, the
realisation ofthe vector ofnon-predetermined variables in period t + h is given by

















– as shown in section B.1 – though this would not give insight how the ﬁrst term of the MSE depends on
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and the h-period ahead prediction, given the information available in period t,i s



















Consequently, the h-period ahead prediction error ofthe vector ofnon-predetermined
variables equals




(Yt+h − Yt+h|t )
and the MSE matrix ofthe h-period ahead prediction amounts to
MSE[xt+h|t ]=E
























Apparently, even ifthe MSE matrix of Xt+h|t does not, the MSE matrix ofthe h-period
ahead prediction ofthe non-predetermined variables will depend on the choice ofthe indi-
cator variables at all horizons, because the future values of the non-predetermined variables
will depend on the path ofthe within-period estimates ofthe predetermined variables.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 53
Appendix C The representation of the revision process
According to the model ofthe revision process in Section 3, inf ormation in period t will
comprise error-corrupted observations on qt, qt−1, qt−2 and the true value qt−3,
q
(t)
















and the application ofthe Kalman ﬁlter will simultaneously determine a preliminary es-
timate of qt (the component qt|t), two revised estimates oflast and next to last periods’
output (the components qt−1|t and qt−2|t), and a ﬁnal estimate ofoutput three periods ago
(the component qt−3|t) which will be equal to the true output value qt−3.
Apparently, our model ofmeasurement shows persistence since the initial measurement
error drops out only gradually and it takes three periods to learn about the true value of
output. To make this setup conformable with the measurement model (12) in Section 4,
we augment the vector ofmeasurement errors vt to include lagged values ofthe measure-
ment errors themselves and incorporate the augmented vector ofmeasurement errors in the
generic model (11) in the standard way by embedding the vector ofmeasurement errors
in the vector ofpredetermined variables Xt. As a consequence, the vector ofmeasurement
errors disappears from the obervation equation (12) and, instead, the properly redeﬁned
matrix D1 picks oﬀ the current and past values ofthe measurement errors aﬀecting the
observations on current and past output.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 54
Appendix D Results of further sensitivity analysis
Table D1: Predictions in the Absence of
Measurement Error








Note: This table shows the RMSE ofoutput predictions
(qt+h|t) and annual average inﬂation predictions (˜ πt+h|t)a t
a given forecast horizon h in the absence ofmeasurement
error.
Table D2: The Role ofMoney in Predicting Inﬂation
Forecast RMSE %∆RMSE
Horizon Overall I II Overall I II
00 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.23 0.02 0.23 0.01 -8.43 0.08
2 0.41 0.06 0.41 0.02 -8.13 0.17
4 0.80 0.16 0.78 0.07 -7.54 0.32
8 0.92 0.16 0.91 0.09 -5.89 0.25
16 0.98 0.07 0.98 0.10 -6.15 0.12
Note: This table shows the implications for predicting the annual average
inﬂation rate (˜ π) at a given forecast horizon when ouput is subject to
measurement error.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 55
Table D3: Sensitivity to the Income Elasticity ofMoney Demand
Scaling Factor for the
Information Revision
Income Elasticity ofMoney Demand
Measure Process 1248
%∆RMSE One-Period -1.29 -4.88 -16.13 -38.99
Three-Period Uncorrelated -1.46 -5.71 -17.58 -38.08
Three-Period Correlated -1.59 -5.84 -17.46 -37.51
∆R2 One-Period 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.46
Three-Period Uncorrelated 0.03 0.10 0.28 0.53
Three-Period Correlated 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.45
Information One-Period 8.51 32.79 115.12 323.36
Gain Three-Period Uncorrelated 20.42 81.53 268.61 665.83
Three-Period Correlated 10.29 38.96 124.21 304.21ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 56










One-Period — 0.052 0 0 0.030 0.474
Three-Period Uncorrelated — 0.007 -0.029 -0.039 0.028 0.442
Three-Period Correlated — 0.022 -0.038 -0.019 0.029 0.457
Note: This table shows the optimal indicator weights when money is included in the information
set.
Table D5: The Information Role of Money when Current Output is Unobserved
Information Content
Revision Process RMSE R2 %∆RMSE ∆R2 Info. Gain
One-Period 0.58 0 -1.74 0.03 n.d.
Three-Period Uncorrelated 0.58 0 -1.64 0.03 n.d.
Three-Period Correlated 0.58 0 -1.69 0.03 n.d.
Note: n.d.: The measure ofinf ormation gain is not deﬁned.ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 57













One-Period 0.167 -0.227 0 0 -0.050 -0.113 0.334 —
Three-Period Uncorrelated 0.084 -0.032 -0.023 -0.028 -0.055 -0.101 0.323 —
Three-Period Correlated 0.178 -0.073 -0.032 -0.020 -0.051 -0.082 0.273 —
Filtering with Money
One-Period 0.165 -0.194 0 0 -0.028 -0.111 0.291 0.286
Three-Period Uncorrelated 0.084 -0.030 -0.044 -0.051 -0.029 -0.110 0.289 0.306
Three-Period Correlated 0.181 -0.065 -0.064 -0.016 -0.026 -0.089 0.239 0.299
Table D7: The Information Role of Money in the Time Series Model
Information Content
Revision Process RMSE R2 %∆RMSE ∆R2 Info. Gain
One-Period 0.40 0.21 -1.38 0.02 11.81
Three-Period Uncorrelated 0.42 0.12 -1.71 0.03 22.93
Three-Period Correlated 0.40 0.21 -1.83 0.03 15.46ECB • Working Paper No 84 • November 2001 58













One-Period — -0.054 0 0 -0.059 -0.134 0.404 —
Three-Period Uncorrelated — -0.009 0.004 0.007 -0.060 -0.124 0.385 —
Three-Period Correlated — -0.021 0.010 0.005 -0.059 -0.127 0.390 —
Filtering with Money
One-Period — -0.027 0 0 -0.034 -0.134 0.348 0.343
Three-Period Uncorrelated — -0.009 -0.019 -0.023 -0.033 -0.132 0.343 0.335
Three-Period Correlated — -0.014 -0.019 -0.007 -0.033 -0.132 0.344 0.342
Table D9: Money’s Role in the Time Series Model with Unobs. Current Output
Information Content
Revision Process RMSE R2 %∆RMSE ∆R2 Info. Gain
One-Period 0.44 0.05 -1.62 0.03 56.20
Three-Period Uncorrelated 0.44 0.05 -1.46 0.03 60.57
Three-Period Correlated 0.44 0.05 -1.48 0.03 60.64 
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